CONSUMER EXPECTATIONS AND ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE:
A COMMENTARY
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Expectations play a significant and widespread role in the
morality of ordinary life. Leslie Francis has drawn a helpful and
largely accurate picture of the conditions of their moral relevance:
their reasonableness, encouragement, longevity, centrality in a
person's life, and consistency with background justice.1 In health
care in particular it is important to keep these limits on the moral
force of expectations clearly in mind, for it is virtually inevitable
that a rational and decent system of care will disappoint patients'
and subscribers' expectations at critical and disputed points. The
main reason is simply the oft-rehearsed point about the effect of
insurance: a sharp escalation of people's desire to use services
regardless of increasing cost relative to statistical marginal benefit.
Add to this either employer or societal provision of insurance and
people naturally come to expect coverage of a wide range of care
whose cost is little object. Any medical economy with a high
incidence of insurance will need to find some way to bring expectations under control.
The combination of these expectations with the need to control
them constitutes an extremely explosive mixture for any legal system
that tries to see its justification as largely moral. Take the combination of two of Francis's moral factors, the reasonability of expectations and their encouragement. 2 It may have not been reasonable,
in the most comprehensive sense, for plaintiffs to have had the
expectations that they did (coverage of some debatably costworthy
service, let us say). Yet those expectations will often have been
encouraged, if not by the actual behavior of a defendant employer
or insurer, then at least by the larger context of an insured and
assisted medical economy. In tort law we should want to keep the
heat on the defendant whenever it is she, not just the larger societal
situation, who has encouraged the unreasonable expectations; legal
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dispute will then primarily focus on the alleged fact of encouragement. Our inclination against the defendant here is the strongest
when we can think of the thing that is unreasonable as not only the
expectations that were encouraged, but the encouragement itself.
Perhaps this can be used to clarify Professor Francis's treatment
of Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Burch,5 Adams v. Blue Cross/Blue
Shield,4 and Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield.5 Since the creation
of inflated expectations is so inherent and significant a problem for
any context of insurance, employers and insurers ought to clarify to
employees and subscribers just what limitations to coverage are
involved. If they do not, they will have unreasonably (though
unwittingly, perhaps) encouraged unreasonable expectations. If
they do clarify those limitations, however, they will have refused to
encourage allegedly unreasonable expectations and the burden of
proof will shift to the plaintiff to show that the defendant who
ultimately denies coverage is disappointing a reasonable expectation
nonetheless. Specifically, if all an insurance plan says is that it will
pay for all care that is "medically necessary treatment" and leaves
that undefined, the terrible ambiguity of "medically necessary"
prevents us from holding plaintiffs responsible for curbing their
expectations; de novo judicial review of the substance of the issue of
whether the disputed item is necessary (reasonable?) care will be
warranted. Or if Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Maryland utters
virtual double-speak by defining uncovered "'experimental or
investigative'" treatments as "'any treatment ... not generally
acknowledged as accepted medical practice by the suitable medical
specialty practicing in Maryland, as decided by us,' " 6 the defendant
should be held to independent court review of what constitutes
"experimental and investigative" measures. On the other hand, if
coverage is explicitly and much more clearly limited to "medically
necessary treatment as defined by the plan administrator," a denial
of coverage should be reviewed under a standard more deferential
to defendants.
All of this illustrates that the law can play a constructive role in
helping a society get expectations under control while also paying
serious attention to their conditional moral weight. Resolving the

3 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
4 757 F. Supp, 661 (D. Md. 1991).
5 898 F.2d 1556 (11th Cir. 1990); see Francis,supranote 1, at 1907-10 (discussing
these three cases).
6 Adams, 757 F. Supp. at 663 (emphasis added) (quoting the Blue Cross Plan).
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many dilemmas that arise in walking this thin but necessary line,
however, will not be easy. Take, for example, cases where financial
interest may distort substantive judgment about "medical necessity"
or "investigational therapy." Professor Francis reads the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals in Brown as "shifting the burden of proof
to the fiduciary to show that its decision was not self-interested,
when[ever] the fiduciary stands to profit financially from the
benefits denial." 7 On the one hand this makes sense: the fiduciary
cannot be trusted to interpret the language of the agreement if she
has a financial conflict of interest. On the other hand, virtually all
reasonable limitations on care are still self-interested, feeding
constructively into an insurer's or provider's profits. A legal test
involving lack of self-interest once a possibility of profit looms on
the horizon would seem to immobilize the society in coming up with
arrangements that will effectively remove providers' incentive to
overtreat.
This may be why Professor Francis acknowledges later that
"[p]erhaps employers are right to insist that decisions to deny
benefits should be given highly deferential review" as long as "they
have drafted the plan to reserve discretion [explicitly] to the plan
administrator." 8 She means, I take it, that this is right under these
conditions even when the possibility of financial self-interest is
present. Professor Francis indicates her and our nervousness,
though, by the "perhaps." About such a world in which the
responsibility for deciding what care will be covered is simply
contractually assigned to providers or insurers, she notes: "Then
the moral question to ask is whether it would be desirable to create
a world of such uncertainty."9 The procedure has been made clear,
but not one iota of the substance has.
What we yearn for is some sense of a substantive standard for
what constitutes a reasonable level and scope of care. We want that
precisely so that we remain able to form the reasonable expectations
of care on which we can generally rely. The hardest work in getting
health care law to line up roughly with our moral sense is for
people-as individuals, groups, and society-to develop a substantive
sense of what it is reasonable to expect in the way of coverage. The
alignment here of expectations with reality could, I suppose, just
have to wait and get hammered out in the sheer course of events
7 Francis, supra note 1, at 1909.
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that actually unfold in our society, regardless of any sense of what
level and scope of care a human person has any moral right to
10
expect.
Professor Francis has not gone far enough to develop such a
sense, but she has seen a fundamental point of connection between
the larger culture and health care law: consumer expectations, and
expectations that it is reasonable to encourage. She is right to
accord significant weight to contractual language, but also right to
insist that there remain other important moral issues about
expectations.

10 1 have tried elsewhere to defend the moral propriety of tailoring health care to
the level and scope of care that actual, rational, and self-interested persons, before
the time at which they know they are afflicted with the conditions that need
treatment, would be willing to commit themselves to paying for with their accessible
private and public resources. See PAUL T. MENZEL, STRONG MEDICINE: THE ETHICAL

RATIONING OF HEALTH CARE 15-29 (1990). This "prior consent" approach, which
under certain conditions is justified in invoking presumable prior consent, is only a
conceptual direction. It is not a formula from which we can crank out precise
answers to questions about what expectations are reasonable. If its essential idea
would take hold in the culture, however, it would engender in people a sense of
responsibility for their expectations of the level of care that they thought they had a
right to receive.

